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INTRODUCTION
"The Uruguay Round was perhaps the last time when we could
write a new set of rules the way we, the Northern countries, wanted
them, and then grant[] developing countries 'special and differential
treatment' to relieve them of the burden of the rules."'
This recent statement by Commissioner Pascal Lamy frames well
the issue confronting developing countries, and World Trade
Organization ("WTO") Members generally, as the Doha negotiations
begin. 2 Will the WTO continue to write market-liberalizing rules but
1. Speech of Pascal Lamy, European Commissioner for Trade, Steeling the
EU-US Relationship For the Challenges Ahead, The Woodrow Wilson
International Center For Scholars, Washington D.C. (January 25, 2002), available
at http://www.si.edu/NEWS/speeches/lamy.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2002); see
also James L. Kenworthy, US Trade Policy and the World Trade Organization:
The Unraveling of the Seattle Conference and the Future of the WTO, 5 GEO. PUti.
POL'Y REV. 103, 104 (2000) (providing background on the development of rules
within the WTO system, including the evolution of the organization from a "rich
countries' club" of twenty-two members to a large and diverse organization with
more developing nations than developed states).
2. See Kenworthy, supra note 1, at 105-06 (describing the process of a new
multilateral trade negotiation round, beginning with a Ministerial Conference that
authorizes the new round and provides the ground rules for it by setting the
agenda, the modalities, the staging concerns, and the obligation base addressing
application and enforcement). These decisions are published in the Ministerial
Declaration. Trade ministers from the WTO Member countries negotiated and
issued the Ministerial Declaration during negotiations in Doha, Qatar from
November 9-14, 2001. See The Fourth Ministerial Conference (2001) (providing
list of relevant Doha Ministerial documents), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min0le/min0le.htm (last visited
Apr. 14, 2002).
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exempt developing countries from those rules, either explicitly or by
indefinitely delaying their "implementation" of those rules? Will the
WTO instead move toward agreements in which developing
countries participate fully, taking on all obligations but also ensuring
that the overall balance of concessions reflects their interests? Or,
can the WTO strike a balance between these paradigms of "special
treatment" and "equal participation," in a way that promotes market
liberalization as well as the interests of developing countries?
Section I of this article summarizes the theoretical and historical
antecedents of the "special and differential treatment" principle in
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")/WTO
system, under which developing countries should receive greater
market access for their products in developed country markets, while
retaining the ability to protect their own "infant" industries and
agricultural sectors from international competition.' In the Uruguay
Round, negotiators began to blend the "special treatment" principle
with an alternative "equal participation" paradigm, under which
developing countries would accept the same commitments as other
WTO Members and in exchange would see their market access
interests recognized by other countries.' Thus, in many Uruguay
Round agreements, developing countries accepted the same
obligations as other WTO Members. Yet, the principle of "special
treatment" remained, as developing countries were granted phase-in
periods in which to comply with their obligations.'
Section II critiques the results of the "special treatment" principle,
in operation now for over thirty years, which has not achieved
sufficient market access for products of interest to developing
countries and arguably has preserved internal economic
inefficiencies in these states.6 While the Uruguay Round represented
3. See itfra notes 11-41 and accompanying text (outlining the origins and
principles of the special and differential treatment, and laying out relevant GATT
provisions).
4. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 388 (2nd Ed. 1999) (noting Uruguay Round result wherein
developing countries were given time to phase in domestic compliance with new
rules, but developing countries were also asked to make general reciprocal trade
liberalization commitments).
5. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 43-73 and accompanying text (explaining specifically why
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an effort to address the problems of the "special treatment" approach,
the resulting blend has not provided satisfactory results to developing
countries. They have sought further extensions of the phase-in
periods, arguing that the periods are unrealistic and arbitrary.
Moreover, the Uruguay Round approach did not enable the
developing countries to bargain for sufficient market access
commitments from the developed countries.7
Section III discusses the Doha Declaration's approach to special
treatment for developing countries, summarizing the key provisions
and arguing that the negotiators have an opportunity to move toward
a more sophisticated combination of the traditional "special
treatment" approach with the "equal participation" model.' On one
hand, there is a powerful argument that developing countries should
receive enhanced market access for their goods, through both: (1)
preferential access for goods exported by the least developed
countries, and (2) making greater efforts to liberalize trade in sectors
which are important to many developing countries, such as
agriculture and textiles. On the other hand, there is less justification
for applying special treatment to allow developing countries to
maintain high levels of protection, given the demonstrated costs of
this approach.9 Therefore, special treatment allowing market
protection should only apply to a minimal number of sectors that are
particularly sensitive for individual developing countries. Moreover,
minimal market protection should promote greater willingness by
developed countries to make improved market access offers on
products of interest to developing countries.
A blend of "special treatment" with "equal participation" should
result in a higher degree of market liberalization than has occurred in
the past, as developing countries open their national markets to a
greater degree and receive commensurate access for their export
the "special treatment" approach has not been completely effective).
7. See infra notes 44-56 and accompanying text (outlining market access
difficulties that have arisen).
8. See infra notes 74-85 and accompanying text (exploring the new
opportunities and describing the changed political situation that could lead to
improving the balance between "special treatment" and "equal participation").
9. See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 4, at 371 (acknowledging costs of
insulating developing countries' export industries from international competition).
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products.' 0 The Doha Declaration reflects tension between these two
philosophies, and this tension will continue throughout the new
round of trade negotiations, with inevitable political battles as
countries maneuver for maximum advantage.
I. OVERVIEW OF "SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL
TREATMENT" IN THE GATT/WTO SYSTEM
A. ORIGIN OF THE PRINCIPLE
The principle of special and differential treatment has been the
traditional approach of the GATT/WTO system to address
inequitable distribution of wealth among its Members." While the
principle collides with another core principle of international
economic law, i.e., the Most-Favored Nation clause, 2 the idea to
treat small economies differently quickly emerged in the history of
GATT. 3 In the late 1940s, during the negotiations aimed at
establishing the International Trade Organization ("ITO"),
developing countries were concerned about:
[W]hich trade restrictions would be subjected to international control and
which not. From the point of view of the less-developed country, the
wealthy countries wanted freedom to use those restrictions that only they
10. See infra notes 135-46 and accompanying text (recommending a course of
action for the negotiations and prescribing a practical balance).
11. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF THE GATT: A
LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, ch. 25,
625-71 (Michie Co. 1969) (describing the origins of the special and differential
treatment within the GATT system and analyzing Article XVIII and Part IV);
Frank J. Garcia, Trade and Inequality: Economic Justice and the Developing
World, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 975, 989-94 (2000) (describing the principles of
special and differential treatment under GATT).
12. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. I, sec. IV,
61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] ("[A]ny
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any [WTO Vlember] to any
product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for
the territories of all other [WTO Members].").
13. See Garcia, supra note 11, at 1025-26 (remarking that providing special
market access violates the most-favored nation principle, but that granting this
measure is fair).
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were most able to use effectively while banning those restrictions that
less-developed countries felt they were most able to use.
14
The principle of special and differential treatment is an attempt to
resolve the competing demands for trade liberalization and equitable
socio-economic development. 5 Although economic theory would
suggest that it is in lesser-developed countries' best interest to open
their markets to foreign competition, these countries wanted to
protect their infant industries from the technologically advanced
industries of developed nations.6 In other words, Members
considered the introduction of temporary restrictions, unde-r which
developing countries could protect their economy and engage in
economic growth, as politically and economically necessary. 7
At the same time, developing countries sought to secure access for
their products in developed countries' markets.' 8 Market access was
seen as an adequate and desirable response to the inequality of
consumer markets' among GATT Members." Thus, special and
differential treatment has two aspects: (1) protection of developing
14. See JACKSON, supra note 11, at 637-38.
15. See Asoke Mukerji, Developing Countries and the WTO: Issues of
Implementation, 34(6) J. OF WORLD TRADE 33, 35-36 (2000) (explaining that
creating exceptions to the basic principles of the GATT by allowing developing
countries to use temporary restrictions to safeguard their economic reserves
represented a solution to these tensions).
16. See Garcia, supra note 11, at 989 (contrasting theory and practice, and
noting that in practice, unrestricted competition in an unprotected developing
country market would significantly affect unemployment and industrialization in
these states, and ultimately harm export-oriented developed economies); see also
Mukerji, supra note 15, at 36 (referring to the need for lesser-developed countries
to expand their domestic industries).
17. See Mukerji, supra note 15, at 35-36 (justifying the exceptions to provide
opportunities and a gestation period for the newly de-colonized countries to grow
their economy in order to become equal participants in, and beneficiaries of, the
emerging international economic order).
18. See Garcia, supra note 11, at 989 (explaining that in addition to benefiting
from market protection measures for their markets, these nations also enjoy
preferential access to developed country markets for their exports).
19. See id. at 1025-26 (justifying this exception to the Most Favored Nation
("MFN") principle as a fair solution to resolve tensions between developing and
developed countries).
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country markets; and (2) enhanced access to developed country
markets.20
The principle of special and differential treatment emerged partly
from the rhetoric of post-colonialism. Essentially some argued that
developing countries were in an unequal position due largely to the
legacy of colonial oppression.- In an attempt to frame the principle,
Professor Garcia has proposed an analytical model based on existing
liberal theories and, in particular, on John Rawls' conception of
justice.22 At the international level, the principle of special and
differential treatment is the translation of the concept that unequals
should benefit from different treatment through the operation of re-
distributive mechanisms.23 This is the egalitarian conception of
justice. 24 The egalitarian conception of international trade postulates
that without adequate resources, less-advanced economies are unable
to take full advantage of their opportunities resulting from free trade.
Access to certain resources is essential for these countries in order to
meet their development requirements. As a result, the egalitarian
conception favors an unequal or different treatment of GATT
20. See id. at 988-95 (describing these two categories of benefits stemming
from special and differential treatment).
21. See id. at 982-83 (describing the economic situation of developing
countries after decolonization); see also Mukerji, supra note 15, at 35 (identifying
developing countries as former colonies, and presenting the rationale for special
and differential treatment).
22. See Garcia, supra note 11, at 997-1002 (outlining Rawls' theory of justice
and inequality); see also Frank J. Garcia, Svinposiun: Global Trade Issues in the
New Millennium: Building a Just Trade Order.for a New Millennium, 33 GEO.
WASH. INT'L L. REv. 1015, 1027-29 (2001) [hereinafter Garcia, Global Trade
Issues] (setting forth Rawls' theory, his use of a contractarian device in his
approach, and contrasting it with Kant's doctrine of justice).
23. See Garcia, Global Trade Issues, supra note 22, at 1021, 1028-29 (noting
that egalitarianism is a strand of political liberalism, and that under Rawls' theory,
redistribution is a tool for creating and allocating new economic benefits as a result
of advantages and wealth that would not otherwise arise in the absence of social
and economic cooperation).
24. Id. at 1053 (contrasting egalitarianism with a libertarian concept of justice,
under which just trade deals only with the formal equality of opportunity that free
trade accomplishes). Under such an approach, preferential treatment as a
redistributive tool would ultimately represent coercion, since the developed
countries could not benefit from this treatment. Id.
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Members depending on their state of development.2" Under an
egalitarian approach, wealthy Members should open their markets to
imports of goods from less-developed countries, while these less-
developed states have the right to postpone adoption and
implementation of a wide range of disciplines imposed under the
rules of international trade.26
The GATT/WTO system has incorporated the redistributive
conception and policies under the principle of special and differential
treatment.2 7 Within the current GATT/WTO system, there are an
estimated one hundred forty-five provisions that apply this principle
to various degrees.28
B. BASIC GATT/WTO PROVISIONS INCORPORATING THE
PRINCIPLE OF SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT
As noted, the principle of special and differential treatment
includes two broad categories of measures: market protective
measures and preferential access.29 For the most part, GATT 1947
originally did not distinguish between trade of developing and
25. See generally Garcia, supra note 11, at 1025-49 (analyzing trade and
inequality, and ways to remedy the inequity).
26. At the same time, under a utilitarian type of approach, developed countries
view the principle as an instrument that would stabilize the GATT system, while
securing development in future markets.
27. See Garcia, Global Trade Issues, supra note 22, at 1051 (emphasizing that
special and differential treatment is at the center of the GATT-WTO approach to
address the problem of inequality); see also infra note 28 and accompanying text
(detailing the implementation of the special and differential treatment doctrine in
specific agreements).
28. See Committee on Trade and Development, Implementation of Special and
Differential Treatment Provisions in the WTO Agreements and Decisions, at 3,
WT/COMTD/W/77 (Oct. 25, 2000) [hereinafter Implementation of Special and
Differential Treatment] (noting that the 145 provisions are spread across several
Agreements, Understandings and Ministerial Decisions, and that of the one
hundred seven provisions the Member states adopted, only twenty-two apply to
least-developed country Members), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen-search.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2002); see also
TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 4, at 388-94 (illustrating examples of special
and differential treatment for developing countries within the WTO Agreements).
29. See Garcia, supra note 11, at 989 (delineating the two categories of benefits
under the special and differential treatment concept).
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developed countries.3 0  However, beyond the limited tariff
concessions developing countries made under Article II of GATT,
Article XVIII-"Government Assistance to Economic
Development"-authorized less advanced economies to "deviate
temporarily" from the provisions of the GATT.3 Such deviations
include tariff increases to foster infant industries, quantitative
restrictions for balance of payments purposes, - any measures
necessary to promote a particular industry, and, generally, a
permission to deviate from any GATT rule for countries in transition.
Under Article XVIII, developing countries thus could take virtually
any measure to protect their infant industries. Thus, developing
countries enjoy wide discretion under GATT when implementing
development policies. Developing countries have used market
protection measures to shield their industries from foreign
competition and, in particular, from highly competitive industries
located in developed countries.33
In addition to these market protective measures, developing
countries have argued that their products should receive preferential
access in developed country markets." The principle of lower tariff
rates for imports into industrial countries from developing countries
resulted in two significant initiatives in the 1960s. By 1965, the
30. See Jose E. Alvarez & David W. Leebron, Symposium: The Boundaries of
the WTO, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 5, 9 (Jan. 2002) (explaining that due to the original
intent that GATT was to be a temporary or interim agreement until the
International Trade Organization was approved, many issues including economic
development were not incorporated into the original GATT).
31. See GATT, supra note 12, art. II (authorizing Members to accord MFN
treatment to goods listed in annexed schedules), id. art. XVIII (authorizing
flexibility in tariff concessions, ability to impose quotas, and provision of
government assistance by developing countries for economic development
purposes).
32. See id. art. XII (outlining GATT legal restrictions that may be imposed "'to
safeguard [a Member's] external financial position and its balance of
payments...").
33. See Frieder Roessler, Domestic Policy Objectives and the Multilateral
Trade Order: Lessons from the Past, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 513, 516 (1998)
(noting developing countries invoked Article XVIII as a legal justification for
import substitution); see also id. at 519-20 (arguing that the "cause of development
was not served by releasing developing countries from their GATT obligations").
34. See id. at 519-20 (noting development initiative in the 1960s and 1970s
wherein developing countries lobbied for tariff preferences).
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addition of Part IV provided principles and objectives for trade and
development.35 While hortatory for the most part, Part IV includes
specific commitments by developed countries to "accord high
priority to the reduction and elimination of trade barriers" and to
"refrain from introducing, or increasing the incidence of, customs
duties or non-tariff barriers" on products of particular export interest
of less-developed countries.36
Shortly thereafter, the GATT contracting parties authorized a
general system of preferences in 1971 for a ten-year period.3 7 The
general system of preferences enabled developed countries to accord
more favorable treatment to products originating from developing
countries. Then during the Tokyo Round negotiations, which
concluded in 1979, the parties adopted the so-called "Enabling
Clause," which authorized developed countries to depart from their
MFN obligations in according "differential and more favorable
treatment to developing countries, without according such treatment
to other Contracting Parties."38 The Enabling Clause does not impose
an obligation on developed countries to accord differential treatment
to exports from developing countries. It merely allows developed
countries to depart from their MFN obligations to accord preferential
treatment on products from developing countries.
With the adoption of the Uruguay Round Agreements, the concept
of special and differential treatment evolved further, and has been
35. See Protocol Amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade To
Introduce a Part IV on Trade and Development, Feb. 8, 1965, GATT, B.I.S.D.
(13th Supp.) 1-11 (1965) (acknowledging the importance of trade to economic
development in developing countries and especially the importance of export
oriented industries to development and the need to facilitate development of export
industries).
36. GATT, supra note 12, art. XVII(l)(b) and (c).
37. See Generalized System of Preferences, June 15, 1971, GATT B.I.S.D.
(18th Supp.) at 24-26 (1972) (setting forth the terms of the preferential
arrangements). This is the so-called waiver to the MFN clause.
38. See Differential and More Favorable Treatment: Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th
Supp.) at 203-05 (1980) [hereinafter Differential and More Favorable Treatment]
(recording the decision of the Contracting Parties to allow differential and more
favorable treatment for developing countries because of their special economic
situation, setting out the terms and purposes of such treatment, and noting that
developed countries do not expect reciprocity).
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adopted in one form or another in virtually all of the WTO
Agreements. While a listing of these provisions is beyond the scope
of this article, the WTO Secretariat has proposed a useful typology of
these provisions.39 The major innovation resulting from the Uruguay
Round negotiations was the adoption of identical commitments
applying to all Members irrespective of their level of development,
but with longer implementation periods for developing country
Members.4" Because the Uruguay Round was agreed as a single
package, with a greatly expanded scope, developing countries lacked
the capacity to integrate and implement the results of the round of
negotiations immediately. With respect to developing countries,
capacity building and technical assistance were necessary for the
application and implementation of this new set of rules.' Examples
of deferred application of WTO disciplines for developing countries
include Article 27.4 of the Subsidies Code, which allows developing
countries to phase out all export subsidies within an eight-year
period, and Article 20 of the Customs Valuation Code, which
provides that developing countries may delay application of the code
for a period of five years from the date of entry into force of the
WTO.42 Thus the Uruguay Round essentially added a third concept-
39. See Implementation of Special and Differential Treatment, supra note 28
(describing in detail the implementation of the special and differential treatment
provision in numerous agreements, including the Agreement on Agriculture, the
Agreement on Textile and Clothing, and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade, among others). The Secretariat made the following distinctions: (i)
provisions aimed at increasing the trade opportunities of developing country
Members (e.g., Enabling Clause and Part IV of GATT); (ii) provisions under
which WTO Members should safeguard the interests of developing country
Members (e.g., Article 15 of the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of
GATT, Articles 27.1 and 27.15 of the Subsidies Code and Article 10.1 of the SPS
Agreement); (iii) flexibility of commitments, of action, and use of policy
instruments (e.g., GATT Article XVIII and the Enabling Clause); (iv) transitional
time periods (i.e., eighteen provisions across eight agreements establish time-
bound exemptions from disciplines otherwise applicable); (v) technical assistance
and (vi) specific provisions for least developed countries. li.
40. See Kenworthy, supra note 1, at 105 (stating that during the Uruguay
Round, and even before, the developed nations acknowledged that the economic
needs of developing countries required special and differential treatment, including
delayed phase-in implementation of the new rules).
41. See id. (noting that technical assistance was designed to help developing
countries comply with the new rules).
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delayed implementation-to the market access and market protection
components of special and differential treatment, discussed above.
II. THE CRITIQUE OF THE SPECIAL AND
DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT PRINCIPLE
The principle of special and differential treatment is criticized for
its lack of implementation and its failure to achieve concrete results
for developing countries' economies. 3 The following section
addresses some of the most important issues raised by the existing
rules on special and differential treatment by focusing on the three
current aspects of the principle: market access, market protection,
and implementation.
A. MARKET ACCESS
As a general matter, many of the special and differential treatment
provisions relating to market access are hortatory and do not bind
developed country Members. Because their language does not direct
any action, but merely encourages or promotes active participation of
industrialized country Members in the development efforts of
developing countries, many provisions effectively are "soft law;- i.e.,
a WTO dispute settlement panel cannot review any alleged violation
of these provisions.44
Market access provisions are essentially handled through the
general system of preferences ("GSP").4 - While, from a conceptual
42. See The Uruguay Round Final Act: Full Texts (1994) (listing all the WTO
Agreements), at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/finale.htm.
43. See General Council, Proposal for a Framework Agreement on Special and
Differential Treatment, at 3, WT/GC/W/442 (2002) [hereinafter Framework
Agreement Proposal] (stating that provisions have fallen short of providing
necessary flexibility to developing countries to facilitate economic development,
and implying that the objectives sought were not achieved), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen-search.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2002).
44. See Gustavo Olivares, The Case for Giving Effectiveness to GA TT/WTO
Rules on Developing Countries and LDCs, 35(3) J. OF WORLD TRADE 545, 547-48
(2001) (noting "soft law" approach in WTO provisions relating to developing
countries and commenting that these provisions are essentially unenforceable).
45. See Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.
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point of view, a system of preferences should ensure that developing
countries become full participants in world trade through their
growing share of exports; the GSP programs have been flawed in
their implementation.
First, because the GSP program is primarily administered by the
granting state, it is "particularly vulnerable to manipulations by
domestic industries since their products compete directly with those
of developing countries.46  For instance, under U.S. law,
characteristics of the GSP include unilateralism, conditionality and
the exclusion of the articles deemed "import sensitive." 7 The
unilateral aspect of the program subjects it to annual review,4" and
makes it unstable and more dependent upon domestic considerations.
The conditionality attached to granting the GSP status to a
developing country includes, among other things, an evaluation of
the beneficiary's level of protection of intellectual property rights,49
equitable market opening to U.S. products and investments," and
assurance that the beneficiary will not engage in unreasonable export
practices.5' This conditionality can discourage or hurt exporters of
the beneficiary country to the extent that they could lose their
203-05 (authorizing GSP programs amongst GATT Members for benefit of
developing countries).
46. See Garcia, supra note 11, at 1030 (discussing the weaknesses of unilateral
implementation of special and differential treatment, and citing U.S. preferential
trade practice as an example of a poorly administered program).
47. See 19 U.S.C. § 2463(b) (2001) (stating the articles that the President
cannot designate as eligible for GSP treatment, include articles that are import
sensitive, and certain agricultural products); JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1131-36 (West 3rd ed.
1995) (outlining the U.S. GSP scheme and the criteria used for detailing what
articles are not eligible for GSP treatment).
48. See 19 U.S.C. § 2465 (2002) (providing the date of termination of special
and beneficial treatment as Sept. 30, 2001).
49. See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(c)(5) (2001) (listing the extent to which a country
provides adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights as a factor
affecting the designation of a country as a beneficiary developing country).
50. See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(c)(4) (2001) (listing the extent to which a country
provides equitable and reasonable access to the markets and basic commodity
resources, as well as assurance to the United States that it will refrain from
engaging in unreasonable export practices as a factor affecting the designation of a
country as a beneficiary developing country).
51. Id.
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investments if the grantor state-in this example the United States-
withdraws its GSP benefits. In addition, the exclusion of import
sensitive products that are of particular interest to developing
countries protects less-competitive industries in the granting state. As
a result, rather than building the trade relationship on the basis of
comparative advantages, the exclusion of import sensitive products
renders the system less attractive to developing countries while
imposing higher prices on consumers in the granting state.
Second, the general system of preferences has become less
attractive because there have been successive negotiating rounds,
which have resulted in significant tariff reductions. 2 The economic
benefits resulting from preferential access elude developing countries
as tariff barriers among industrialized nations are waning. This puts
developing countries in the awkward position of resisting global
trade liberalization that would undercut the value of existing
preferential treatment.
Third, the "enabling clause" discussed earlier was counterbalanced
by the "graduation clause," which anticipated that developing
countries would accept greater obligations under GATT as their
economic situations improved. 3 The graduation clause took the form
of reduced access to export markets once industrialized nations
found that the developing country had reached a certain level of
competition with domestic products.54 Finally, Part IV of the GATT
was virtually inoperative as the United States and the European
Union did not meet their commitments to refrain from imposing
52. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEv., OPEN MARKETS MATrER:
THE BENEFITS OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION 31 (OECD ed. 1998)
(noting reduction of tariffs from an average of forty percent in 1947 to an average
of four percent during the Uruguay Round).
53. See Differential and More Favorable Treatment, supra note 38, at 204
(allowing developed countries to modify treatment of developing countries, in
response to changes in development and financial needs); see also 1982 Report by
the Secretariat General of UNCTAD, Assessment of the Results of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, UNCTAD Doc. T/B/778/Rev. 1, at 29.
54. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2463(c)(2) (2001) (permitting a withdrawal of special
treatment, under U.S. law, to developing countries when the President decides the
country has exported to the United States).
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additional non-tariff barriers on products of primary interest to
developing countries under Article XXXVII of GATT."
In light of the foregoing, during the Uruguay Round negotiations,
large developing countries were inclined to abandon GSP
methodology because such preferences did not provide them with
meaningful access to developed country markets."
B. MARKET PROTECTION
Developing countries made heavy use of the authority in Articles
XII and XVIII of the GATT to deviate from GATT principles in the
past and to limit the scope and margins of their tariff concessions. 7
The non-reciprocity in the level of concessions and the large
flexibility accorded to developing countries to depart from GATT
disciplines can be criticized on two grounds. First, developing
countries have been unable to obtain significant concessions on
products of interest to them from developed economies by failing to
participate in the exchange of reciprocal reductions in trade
barriers.5 8 For example, industrialized countries singled out textiles
and agriculture, which are important products for developing
countries, and subjected these industries to extremely high import
55. See GATT, supra note 12, art. XXXVII (outlining developed countries'
commitment to "accord high priority" to reducing and eliminating barriers to
products of particular interest to developing countries and to take developing
countries' trade interests into account when considering other measures permitted
under the GATT agreement).
56. See Michael Rom, Some Earl), Reflections on The Uruguay Round
Agreements As Seen From The Viewpoint Of a Developing Countr, 28(6) J. OF
WORLD TRADE 5, 8 (1994) (arguing that many large developing countries opted for
individual concrete negotiations and rejected the "handouts" of preferential
negotiations, from which developed nations could unilaterally withdraw).
57. See Chantal Thomas, Balance-of-Paynents Crises in the Developing
World: Balancing Trade, Finance and Development in the New Economic Order,
15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1249, 1256 (2000) (explaining that developing countries
often used Article XII to implement quantitative safeguards to protect against
external financial situations and that Article XVIII allows a large amount of
discretion for developing countries to impose trade restrictions).
58. See Constantine Michalopoulous, Developing Countr, Strategies Jbr the
Millennium Round, 33(5) J. OF WORLD TRADE 1, 25 (1999) (arguing that empirical
and analytical studies suggest that developing countries' use of rights exempting
them from WTO provisions negatively affects their trade and development).
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restrictions. 9 At the same time, developing countries had to accept
the initiative of the "Quad" countries (the United States, the
European Union, Japan, and Canada) to include intellectual property
rights, services, and, to a limited extent, investment in the Uruguay
Round negotiations.6"
The second critique of these protections is that they allow
developing countries to distort domestic resource allocation and
encourage rent seeking and waste, as well as adversely impacting
growth in productivity and sustainable development. 61 Not only have
those market protection measures been inefficient in terms of
economic development, but also trade restrictions imposed for
balance-of-payments purposes have not had the same efficacy as
macroeconomic policies, such as exchange rate adjustments.62
The critique of market protection measures shows that active
involvement in tariff reduction negotiations could place developing
countries in a better position to obtain major concessions from
developed countries in areas of importance to developing countries.
In other words, the long-term interests of developing countries may
be better served if they were able to improve their negotiating
position by offering to liberalize their economies and open their
markets to import competition. In this way, developing countries
could bargain more effectively to obtain market access on products
of interest to their economies. 63
59. See Mukerji, supra note 15, at 40-48 (discussing the significant negative
impact of restrictions on textiles and agriculture has on developing countries).
60. See Phillip M. Nichols, Forgotten Linkages - Historical Institutionalism
and Sociological hIstitutionalism and Analysis of the World Trade Organization,
19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 461, 461 (1998) (arguing that although the WTO is
premised on equal participation, the true construct is one based on historic
institutionalism, where the Quad countries set the agenda and developing countries
merely play a reactive role in negotiations).
61. See Michalopoulos, supra note 58, at 25 (proposing this critique to
challenge the reasoning for developing countries' exemption from WTO
disciplines).
62. See id. at 26 (suggesting that macro-economic measures such as exchange
rate adjustments are more effective because unlike protections, these measures do
not adversely impact resource allocation and productivity).
63. See David A. Gantz, Failed Efforts To Initiate The "Millenniun Round'" in
Seattle: Lessons For Future Global Trade Negotiations, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 349, 351-52 (2000) (suggesting that the goals of developing nations will
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C. IMPLEMENTATION
Finally, in the area of implementation, the transition periods
negotiated under the Uruguay Round have some appeal because all
Members have made the same commitment while allowances have
been made for the technical implementation difficulties that
developing countries will face in attempting to meet their
commitments. Developing countries, however, now view the
transition periods as unrealistic and not commensurate with the
concurrent need for capacity building to implement the agreements.
Developing countries have noted that special and differential
treatment "underwent a dramatic transformation in the Uruguay
Round Agreements." 6 Consequently, developing countries have
argued that the different phase-in periods, provided for developing
countries in the Uruguay Round Agreements, fail to recognize their
specific development needs. 6 Today, some of the implementation
periods have already expired and few developing countries have
been able to fully integrate the results of the Uruguay Round.6 While
the United States favored extensions on a case-by-case basis,
developing countries have been pressing the case for an additional
blanket grace period to implement the newly adopted trade
agreements.67
Although developing countries consider the technical assistance
provisions of the Uruguay Round to be of critical importance, they
continue to view such provisions as a virtual dead letter. For
instance, in the area of technical barriers to trade ("TBT"), little
effort has been made to implement the commitment to help
likely be contingent upon reciprocal concessions to the European Union and the
United States).
64. See Framework Agreement Proposal, supra note 43 (noting that the
concept of special and differential treatment shifted from addressing
developmental problems to implementation problems).
65. See id. (noting the change in focus meant, among other things, that the
same principles would be applicable to developing countries at different stages of
development when determining the transitional period for technical assistance).
66. See Gantz, supra note 63, at 363 (remarking that developing countries were
concerned with failing to meet the January 2000 deadline for TRIPS, TRIMS, and
Customs Valuation Agreement).
67. See id. at 352 (reporting that the United States declined to discuss
extending blanket grace periods for the implementation of trade agreements).
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developing countries tackle the special difficulties they face in the
formulation and application of standards.68 While such technical
assistance may not be "special and differential treatment" as such,
technical assistance is critically necessary if developing countries are
to assume the full obligations of WTO membership. The lack of
ability to comply with existing commitments is frequently cited as a
reason why developing countries are reluctant to take on new
commitments.
Moreover, due partly to the extended phase-in of WTO
commitments for developing countries, as well as their unwillingness
to make strong commitments in certain areas of interest to the
developed countries (e.g., services), 69 the Uruguay Round
agreements did not achieve significant near-term market access for
developing country products. The Uruguay Round did produce one
agreement that developing countries perceived as significantly
reducing trade barriers in developed country markets. The
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing provides for the phasing-out
over a ten year period of the existing quotas and tariff-rate quotas on
68. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), art. II, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex I A (Apr. 15, 1994)
(outlining technical assistance commitments to developing countries in the area of
standards), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/finalce.htm.
See generally OXFAM Report: Rigged Rules and Double Standards: Trade,
Globalization, and the Fight Against Poverty, Ch. 9 (Apr. 2002) (noting the lack of'
technical assistance for developing countries, which detracts from their ability to
participate in development of trade rules), available at
http://www.maketradefair.org/stylesheet.asp?file=-03042002121618&cat=2&subca
t=5&select=l. But see Press Release, WTO, Moore Welcomes Oxfam Report But
Cites Omissions and Errors (Apr. 11, 2002) (acknowledging the need to increase
capacity of developing countries by providing technical assistance and noting that
the WTO is currently working with the World Bank, UNCTAD, the U.N.
Development Programme and the IMF to that end), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres02-e/pr285_e.htm. Developing countries
lack the minimum infrastructure to grapple with the multiplication of international
standards; thus, developing countries experience great difficulties in ensuring that
their products comply with such standards. As a result, in addition to high tariff
barriers on products that are of particular interest to developing countries, they also
must confront technical barriers to trade.
69. This reluctance to liberalize trade in services has continued after the
Uruguay Round. See 11 WASH. TRADE DAILY. Feb. 6, 2002, at 2 (reporting
remarks of Dr. Supachai Panitchpakdi, incoming Director General of the WTO,
who said developing countries have concerns about opening their services markets
to developed countries without special conditions).
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textile products in the United States, the European Union, Canada
and Norway.7 ° While developing countries have criticized the lack of
adequate implementation of this agreement,7 to a large extent the
problem is that the Textiles Agreement simply did not provide for
definitive near term market access. In the area of agriculture, which
is another important product area for developing countries, the
Uruguay Round's Agreement on Agriculture" is generally viewed as
containing little discipline on developed country export subsidies."
In sum, the Uruguay Round approach, like the traditional GATT
"special treatment" approach, has been unsuccessful in promoting
developing countries' interests. Over the past thirty years of its
existence, the principle of "special and differential treatment" has not
achieved enough for developing countries in terms of their economic
growth and access to markets. The critique of the special and
differential treatment provisions raises the question as to whether
there is a better alternative or a modification of approach to the
special and differential treatment concept that could yield more
encouraging results for developing countries.
III. FROM SEATTLE TO DOHA: THE RISE OF
"EQUAL PARTICIPATION?"
The progression from the 1999 WTO Ministerial meeting in
Seattle to the 2001 meeting in Doha shows the dramatic increase in
the importance and self-confidence of developing countries within
70. See Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, art. 2.8, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA (Apr. 15, 1994)
(committing Members to gradually phase out restrictions on textiles over a ten year
period), available at http:/www.wto.org/englishdocs-e/legal-elfinale.htm.
71. See World Trade Organization Annual Report 2001, at 31 [hereinafter
WTO Annual Report] (noting the slow pace of elimination of quotas on textiles
and clothing), at https:/secure.vtx.ch/shop/boutiques/wto-index-boutique.html
(last visited Apr. 15, 2002).
72. See Agreement on Agriculture, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A (Apr. 15, 1994), available at
http://wvwv.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal e/final e.htm.
73. See Mukerji, supra note 15, at 47 (pointing out that, although the majority
of developing countries are unable to provide export subsidies, developed
countries may utilize such subsidies). Mukerji notes that the European Union
spends seven billion U.S. dollars in export subsidies for agriculture. ld. at n.40.
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the WTO negotiating framework. The Seattle talks broke down, in
part, because of the divergence between developing countries'
perception of their increased role, and the developed countries' more
traditional understanding of WTO negotiations as a forum where
deals could be struck among the key Members. During the Doha
negotiations, however, all participants appreciated that developing
countries were central to the launch of a new round. This
appreciation resulted in the Doha Declaration repeatedly
acknowledging the importance of developing country interests.7 4
The stage is thus set for a critical juncture in the world trading
system. While it is clear that developing countries are now central to
the ability of the WTO to move forward, it is unclear as to how
developing countries will use this influence. Will they seek to
maintain existing market protections, under the rubric of "special
treatment?" If so, will this strategy lead the developed countries to
refuse the market access concessions that developing countries
demand? Or, will developing and developed countries be able to
strike a liberalizing balance, wherein developing countries' market
access interests are given special priority and in exchange developing
countries commit to significant liberalization of their national
markets? The success of the negotiations launched in Doha is likely
to turn on the unpredictable answers to these (and other) questions.
In Seattle, developing countries came for the first time with a
definite agenda that placed conditions on their participation in a next
round of trade liberalization.75 They articulated their wish list on
logistical and budgetary shortcomings that hindered their full
participation in the WTO implementation process.76 Not only did
they express concern about the need to make the special and
differential provisions more effective, they also requested the
74. See Doha Ministerial Declaration (Nov. 14, 2001), WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/I
[hereinafter Doha Declaration], available at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewtoe/ministe/min0le/mindecl_e.htm.
75. See Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Evolving Multilateral Trade Svstem In The
New Millennium, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 419, 429 (2001) (explaining that
developing countries prepared a definite agenda in a string of meetings prior to the
Seattle Conference).
76. See Kenworthy, supra note 1, at 108 (noting that because of the lack of
technical assistance, developing countries have been unable to cope with the short
time-limits to implement the agreements).
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elimination of trade barriers and distorting trade practices in areas of
particular interest to them.77 In general, developing countries worked
in a focused and unified manner that greatly increased effectiveness.
By contrast, the United States and the European Union were not
only unable to agree on a common list of items for inclusion in the
next round of negotiations," but they articulated priorities that either
conflicted directly with or failed to address developing countries'
demands. For instance, the European Union was unwilling to accept
any discussion on agricultural price supports and export subsidies,
while it was seeking to include competition and investment in the
agenda.79 The United States proposed a linkage between trade and
minimum environmental and labor standards (which developing
countries saw as potentially jeopardizing their market access), but
refused to discuss broader extension of the phase-in periods for
implementation or to include the Antidumping Agreement in the
discussion.80
In addition to the substantive divergences of agenda, the Seattle
Ministerial meeting was the theatre of growing frustration among
developing countries based on their perception of exclusion from the
negotiations.8 During the meeting, developing countries insisted that
77. See, e.g., Daniel D. Bradlow, Global Trade Issues i The New Millennium:
'The Times They Are A-Changin': Some Prelintinar" Thoughts On Developing
Countries, NGOs and The Reform Of The T7O, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV.
503, 504 (2001) (listing developing countries' priorities as obtaining relief in the
implementation of Uruguay Round agreements; opening developed country
markets in the areas of textiles and agriculture; and ensuring that the WTO was
sensitive to problems concerning development).
78. See Rebuild WTO Before Trade Round - Jamaica ' Bernal, 8 WASH.
TRADE DAILY, Dec. 16, 1999, at I (noting Jamaican Amb. Bernal remarks that
Seattle meeting was "politically premature" in part because major players like the
United States and the EU and Japan had not developed any consensus on an
agenda).
79. See Gantz, supra note 63, at 553-54 (stating EU was unwilling to discuss
any meaningful reductions in agricultural price supports).
80. See id. at 353-54 (declaring that the United States failed to execute a well-
planned negotiation, due to conflicting domestic political concerns).
81. See Peter Lichtenbaum, Dispute Settlement and Institutional Issues, 3 J. OF
INT'L ECON. L. 173, 175 (2000) (reporting that representatives from various
developing nations sent communiqu&s condemning the lack of transparency in the
decision making process during the Seattle Conference).
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they be admitted to participate in "green room" 2 conferences held
parallel to the meetings of the working groups. 3 They explicitly
warned that they would block any ministerial declaration that had
been reached without their full participation. 4 Developing nations'
perception of exclusion, based on the reality that developed country
delegations believed they could reach a "backroom deal," materially
undermined the effectiveness of the talks."
Perhaps because of the Seattle failure, the leading industrialized
nations have revised their attitude towards building consensus for
further trade liberalization. In Seattle, the United States and the
European Union came with not enough to bargain with in txchange
for including issues such as investment, competition, environment,
and labor standards as new issues for negotiations. Conscious of the
need to reach a consensus for a new round of negotiations, especially
in the aftermath of the September 11 th terrorist attacks, developed
countries have opened their ears to voices of the developing world.
IV. THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: MIXED
MESSAGES
Building on the lessons learned at Seattle, the kickoff of the Doha
negotiations, at least rhetorically, saw the interests of developing
82. During the Uruguay Round negotiations, contentious issues were discussed
and resolved among key GATT Members in a conference room appended to tile
Office of the Director-General, which was dubbed the "green room."
83. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The WTO In Transition: 01. Constituents,
Competence and Coherence, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 979, 981 n.2 (reporting
that developing countries were not satisfied with the Conference Chairs' attempts
to create working groups allowing more participation by developing countries
because they were still unable to take part in major aspects of parallel
negotiations); see also Markus Krajewski, Democratic LegitimacY and
Constitutional Perspectives of WTO Law, 35(1) J. OF WORLD TRADE 167, 169
(2001).
84. See Dunoff, supra note 83, at 981 n.2 (noting that developing countries
demanded more participation in negotiations, and took a decidedly more
"proactive" role in the Seattle negotiations).
85. See J.B. Penn, Doha Ministerial: A New Impetus for Multilateral
Agricultural Negotiations, 7 ECON. PERSPECTIVES 9, 10 (Jan. 2002) (reporting that
many studies concluded that there was a strong correlation between the level of'
participation of countries in negotiations with the level of benefits resulting from
trade).
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countries squarely in the center of negotiations. As in Seattle, the
developing countries were able to agree on a specific agenda of
issues that they wanted the Conference to address." The nearly
simultaneous accession of China, which has allied itself with
developing countries, lent further weight to developing countries'
ability to participate as equally influential actors in the shaping of
trade negotiations and rules.87
What remains to be seen is how developing countries will exert
this influence and how developed countries will respond. This issue
should be viewed in light of the fact that even before China's
accession to the WTO, developing nations made up approximately
seventy five percent of the WTO's membership. 8 Some developing
nations have indicated that they will seek to extend special and
differential treatment provisions, as well as create new special
treatment provisions.89 Other developing countries, however, may be
prepared to accept significant new obligations, if such obligations
lead to genuine market liberalization in sectors important to their
economies. This section reviews the approach taken in the "Doha
Declaration" and discuss the prospects for the new negotiations.
86. See Rubens Ricupero, Development Implications of Doha, 29 SoMtr
BULLETIN 17, 18 (Feb. 15, 2002) (asserting that developing countries successfully
unified their influence in the two years since Seattle by ensuring the inclusion of
implementation items from their pre-Seattle proposals).
87. See Daniel Pruzin, Developing Countries Set Out Coinmon Position for
Doha Meeting, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1856 (Oct. 4, 2001) (asserting that
Group 77, also known as G-77, has support of 130 countries along with China). As
well as participating individually in Doha and in negotiations leading up to Doha,
developing countries effectively engaged in consensus building amongst
themselves. Groups that participated (and continue to participate) in consensus
building and negotiating include the "African Group", the "Like Minded Group of
Developing Countries," and the Group of 77. The active "Cairns Group" of
agricultural exporters also includes several developing countries. Different groups,
of course, have different regional and development perspectives.
88. See Gantz, supra note 63, at 351 (stating seventy five percent of VTO
Members can be considered developing countries while the so called "rich"
economies only account for about fifteen WTO Members).
89. See WTO Members Push for "Development Box, " AGRA. EUROPE, Feb. 8,
2002, available at 2002 WL 11352599 (listing Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Honduras, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe as nations
who would like some additional form of preferential treatment).
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A. THE DOHA DECLARATION: "SPECIAL TREATMENT" VS. "EQUAL
PARTICIPATION"
The tension between the paradigms of "special treatment" and
"equal participation" is evident in the Doha Declaration, and other
official documents that provide the framework for the negotiations.
What is less clear, however, is whether negotiations will lead to
significant market liberalization on products of interest to developing
countries. The following discussion reviews the Doha Declaration's
development agenda.
1. Doha Decision on "Implementation "Issues
Going into the Doha meetings, developing countries pressed for
action to address the problems they saw with implementation of
existing provisions of the Uruguay Round WTO Agreements.9" As
discussed above, developing countries were not satisfied with the
implementation of commitments made in the Uruguay Round
relating to trade-related technical assistance programs.9 Such
countries also viewed the phase-in provisions in the Agreements as
failures. Many developing countries argued that they were unable to
comply with their many new obligations. Conversely, the developing
countries felt that the developed countries acted too slowly to phase
in commitments in key sectors, such as textiles.
Developing countries, particularly the least-developed countries
(LDCs), sought renewed commitment at Doha-and in the pre-Doha
negotiations-for discussions on implementation issues.92 They were
successful in getting the issue on the agenda, providing additional
evidence that developing countries are now able to participate as
influential actors in the WTO.93 "Implementation-related issues and
90. See Pruzin, supra note 87, at 1546 (noting that "key developing
countries"-Egypt, India, Pakistan-were insisting on implementation
commitments as a quid pro quo for negotiating on new issues).
91. See discussion supra Part II.C. (commenting on developing countries'
complaints about implementation issues).
92. See Harrison, supra note 43, at 19 (detailing the developing countries'
expectation that specific promises made at Brussels regarding development
assistance would be integrated into the WTO Work Program).
93. See Daniel Pruzin, UNCTAD Chief Predicts Progress in Implementing
Existing WTO Pacts, 19 Int. Trade Rep. (BNA) 267 (Feb. 14, 2002) (forecasting
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concerns" are the first topics addressed on the work program of the
Doha Ministerial Declaration.94 Participants agreed in the program
that they "attach the utmost importance" ' to these concerns. The
work program envisions a two-pronged procedure to
implementation: (1) "Where ... specific negotiating mandate [is
provided] in this Declaration, the relevant implementation issues
shall be addressed under that mandate; (2) ... other implementation
issues shall be addressed as a matter of priority by the relevant WTO
bodies. 96
For the latter, the relevant WTO bodies are asked to report to the
TNC for "appropriate action" by the end of this year. Moreover, the
Decision on Implementation Issues lists more than fifty immediate
priorities related to implementation of the Uruguay Round
Agreements. 97
It is too early to tell what the impact of the continued focus on
implementation will have on the question of special and differential
treatment. On one hand, if the implementation focus results in greater
technical assistance for developing countries, this may mean there is
greater willingness to take on new commitments. On the other hand,
if developing countries use these implementation negotiations to seek
the "roll-back" of existing WTO commitments, or to lengthen
extensions of the Uruguay Round phase-in periods, this would likely
reduce their ability to bargain for increased market access in the
developed countries.
that developing countries could reasonably anticipate significant gains during
2002).
94. See Doha Declaration, supra note 74, para. 12 (stating negotiations on
implementation issues will be an "integral" part of the work program).
95. See id.
96. Id.
97. See Doha Ministerial Conference - Decision on Implementation-Related
Issues and Concerns, (Nov. 20, 2001), WT/MIN(01)/17 [hereinafter
Implementation Decision] (responding to developing countries' concerns regarding
problems with implementing Uruguay Round commitments), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thevto_e/minist-e/min0 Ie/mindeclimplementation_
e.htm; see also Pruzin, supra note 93, at 267 (noting that the Decision of
Implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements includes more than fifty
priorities related to that goal).
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WTO Members have already disagreed on how the
implementation discussions will take place. Early in 2002, China,
India, and Pakistan pressed for the creation of dedicated negotiating
groups for implementation issues and for special and differential
treatment issues.9" Developed countries initially resisted this
pressure, but eventually reached a compromise, reaffirming that
implementation issues would be dealt with in the "relevant bodies,"
and that the Committee on Trade and Development would review
special and differential treatment in special sessions.99
2. Commitment to Strengthen "All Special and Differential
Treatment Provisions"
A closing paragraph of the Doha Ministerial Declaration directly
addresses special and differential treatment. Paragraph forty-four
reaffirms that special and differential provisions are an "integral part
of the WTO Agreements" and "agree[s] that all special and
differential treatment provisions shall be reviewed with a view to
strengthening them and making them more precise, effective, and
operational. 100
This language certainly signals a strong political commitment to
the rhetoric of special and differential treatment. The interpretation
98. See WTO Agreement Near on TNC, 11 WASH. TRADE DAILY, Jan. 3 1,
2002, at I (reporting on negotiations on ground rules for Trade Negotiations
Committee ("TNC"), which was established to oversee Doha Development
Agenda talks); id. (noting Pakistani Amb. comment that China, India, and Pakistan
were pressing for separate negotiating groups for Implementation issues and
special and differential treatment issues).
99. See Trade Negotiations Committee - Statement by the Chairman of the
General Council, TN/C/I (Feb. 4, 2002) (maintaining that the "relevant bodies"
would address outstanding negotiations in accordance with the provisions adopted
in the Doha Ministerial Declaration Decision on Implementation-Related Issues
and Concerns), available at http://xvww.wto.org/english/tratop-e/ddae/tnc_e.htm;
see also Alnost There on TNC, 11 WASH. TRADE DAILY, Feb. 1, 2002, at 3
(chronicling various states' opposition to or support of the Harbison compromise
language); Compromise Reached on WTO TNC, II WASH. TRADE DAILY, Feb. 4,
2002, at 1 (suggesting that the Quad Member countries-the United States, the
European Union, Japan, and Canada-were outwardly supportive of the
compromise, but were privately irritated at the "activist role" China, India, and
Pakistan chose to take).
100. See Doha Declaration, supra note 74, at para. 44.
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of this language, however, will be critical. Conceptually, the
language appears to seek to increase the binding of the "soft law"
obligations that have traditionally existed in the GATT/WTO system.
This could promote market liberalization. Special and differential
treatment provisions include, for instance, the GATT obligation to
reduce trade barriers on products of particular export interest to
developing countries.' ° On the other hand, if this "strengthening"
leads to expanded authority for developing countries to protect
domestic industries and agriculture, it risks undermining the WTO
goal of market liberalization, as well as the developing countries'
ability to participate in the negotiations on an equal footing.
3. Comnitment to Special Treatment in Agriculture Negotiations
The Doha Declaration explicitly recognizes a commitment to
special and differential treatment for developing countries in the
agricultural negotiations. 02  The Declaration states that WTO
Members:
[A]gree that special and differential treatment for developing countries
shall be an integral part of all elements of the negotiations and shall be
embodied in the Schedules of concessions and commitments and as
appropriate in the rules and disciplines to be negotiated, so as to be
operationally effective and to enable developing countries to effectively
take account of their development needs, including food security and rural
development.
0 3
This is echoed in the Implementation Decision, which asks Members
to "exercise restraint" with regard to acting against developing
country measures taken for rural development and food security. 'I
101. See discussion supra Part I.B. (describing special and differential treatment
provisions under the GATT).
102. See Doha Declaration, supra note 74, para. 13 (noting that negotiations on
agriculture were already on-going as part of the built-in agenda).
103. Id.
104. See Implementation Decision, supra note 97; see also Renate Harrison,
WTO's "Development Round" and the Least Developed Countries, 31(1) INTL
LAW NEWS 18, 19 (Winter 2002) (reporting that despite significant opposition
from some WTO Members developing countries received a commitment to discuss
agriculture export subsidies and an acknowledgement of the need for special and
differential treatment to address food security and rural development concerns).
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To the extent that the Ministerial Declaration and Implementation
Decision were intended to result in greater tolerance for developing
countries' assistance to their agricultural sectors, this may be a mixed
blessing. It is true that developed countries have provided - and
continue to provide - vast assistance to their agricultural sectors,
under rules that are often written to permit specific assistance
programs that do not exist in developing countries. As a result, it is
entirely understandable that developing countries should seek to
"match" this assistance, given the enormous importance of the rural
sector in their economies.
Developing countries, however, also export significant amounts of
agricultural products to other developing countries. It is estimated
that "potential gains from agricultural trade liberalization between
developing countries is three times greater than the gains developing
countries can expect from liberalization in industrialized
countries."' 5 Increased developing country government assistance to
their agricultural sectors, therefore, could undermine the potential for
increased South-South trade by distorting resource allocation.
Moreover, developing countries may, in fact, gain much more
from the willingness of developed countries to make significant
agricultural policy reforms than they would otherwise gain from the
right to provide greater assistance to their domestic agricultural
sectors. WTO Members have agreed to enter into negotiations on
agriculture with the aim of improving market access and reducing,
"with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies and trade-
distorting domestic farm support."' 16 Such reductions would directly
affect agricultural supports in developed nations, particularly EC
Members, with their ingrained supports for domestic agriculture,
Agricultural reform in the EC could have a very substantial impact
on developing countries' abilities to sustain rural development and
achieve food security. 07 To the extent that developing countries
105. Speech of Michael Moore, The Challenges of the Doha Development
Agenda for Latin American and Caribbean Countries, Feb. 27, 2002, The Inter-
American Development Bank, available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/
spmm-e/spmm78_e.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2002).
106. Doha Declaration, supra note 74, para. 13.
107. See Seeds Sown for Future Growth, ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 2001, at 65
[hereinafter Seeds Sown] ("The habit of subsidising the export of surplus food, a
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emphasize their own right to provide assistance, rather than pressing
to discipline developed country support programs, they may not
achieve the same degree of market liberalization. 0 1
4. Tariff Negotiations
Improving access for their non-agricultural products to developed
world markets was a chief goal of many developing countries. "9 The
decision on market access in the Doha Declaration takes an approach
that addresses developing country concerns as matters of priority for
negotiation. The parties agree to negotiations to reduce or eliminate
tariffs and non-tariff barriers "in particular on products of export
interest to developing countries.""' This commitment, if
implemented, would go beyond the traditional GATT hortatory
commitment to "accord high priority" to reducing trade barriers on
such products, to achieve concrete results."' Rather than leaving it
up to after-the-fact concessions, "upgrading 'loose commitments'
into fully 'binding' and 'enforceable' ones"' 2" would build the
possibility of differential treatment into the main structure of
favourite of the French, is pernicious for poor countries, since it undercuts local
markets. As one African said at Doha, issues that 'may lose elections in France are
life and death in Tanzania."').
108. See Around the Globe, 11 WASH. TRADE DAILY, Feb. 26-27 2002, at 5
(stating that certain developing countries are likely to press hard for agricultural
policy reforms during negotiations). Brazil, for example, has recently indicated
that it is willing to take on U.S. and EU agricultural export and other subsidies in
WTO dispute resolution under the existing rules. Id.; see also Daniel Pruzin, Trade
Officials Assess Winners, Losers in Aftermath of Doha Ministerial Meeting, 18
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1857 (Nov. 22, 2001) (remarking that Brazil, a major
agricultural reporter, is likely to remain engaged in the agricultural negotiations).
Brazil was an active participant in shaping the language on agriculture in the Doha
Declaration. Id.
109. See Harrison, supra note 43, at 19 (stating a priority for developing
countries was to receive duty free and quota free access to developed country
markets for their goods).
110. Doha Declaration, supra note 74, para. 16.
111. See discussion supra Part I.B. (discussing GATT/WTO provisions that
provide for special and differential treatment).
112. See Olivares, supra note 44, at 549 (arguing that the WTO trading system
needs binding commitments to serve as a mechanism for bridging the gap between
poor and rich Members).
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negotiations, giving developing countries more incentive to
participate in negotiations on tariff reductions.
Any tariff reduction would affect all Members, but would
presumably help developing countries more, as the commitment to
negotiate is structured to concentrate on exports that they produce
and trade. For example, in the long run "[t]he commitment to reduce
barriers on industrial goods, particularly 'peak tariffs'-the top rates
that countries use to protect their most sensitive industries-should
imply more access for poor countries' textiles .... "I
However, the commitment to negotiate on tariffs continues to
recognize the principle of "special and differential treatment." The
Doha Declaration states that there may be "less than full reciprocity
in reduction commitments" for developing countries." 4 This opens
the door to the possibility of developing countries seeking market
access from developed countries even though they remain unwilling
to liberalize their own markets in a meaningful way.
5. "Singapore Issues: " Investment, Competition Policy, Government
Procurement, and Trade Facilitation
In pre-Doha meeting negotiations, many developing countries
resisted developed country proposals to undertake negotiations on
investment, competition policy, government procurement, and trade
facilitation-the so-called "Singapore issues.""' 5 Their concerns
related to a belief that they did not have enough capacity to address
existing topics, let alone add new topics for negotiations. At Doha,
developing countries negotiated a delay in negotiations on these
topics until the 5th Ministerial, which will be held in two years.1
They also gained a commitment for technical assistance to build
negotiating capacity." 7 The text of the Doha Declaration accounts for
113. Seeds Sown, supra note 107, at 65.
114. Doha Declaration, supra note 74, para. 16.
115. See Harrison, supra note 104, at 20 (noting that developing countries
resisted expanding WTO negotiating agenda to include Singapore issues).
116. See id. (explaining that the Declaration language requires "explicit
consensus" before negotiations on these matters may move begin).
117. See id. (explaining that the Declaration calls for beginning work on a plan
to ensure long-term funding for WTO-related technical assistance in December
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developing country interests, as it stresses the "need to address the
technical assistance and capacity-building needs of developing
countries on the Singapore issues so that they are able to evaluate the
impact of multilateral arrangements in these areas on their
development objectives."' t
To be successful, the discussions will have to be structured to take
into account developing country interests. Developing countries
appear unwilling to allow negotiations on these issues to proceed
with an "opt-out" for developing countries. For instance, developing
countries reportedly rejected a proposal under which investment
negotiations would begin, but they could later opt out.'"' This might
be positive if it meant that at least some developing countries seek to
be fully integrated into the WTO system (and to ensure that it reflects
their interests), rather than to seek exemptions from commitments to
which the rest of the WTO membership agreed.
However, a more likely interpretation is that these countries were
simply opposed to any and all talks on the Singapore issues. Indeed,
as negotiations begin, some developing countries-in particular
Brazil, Pakistan, Paraguay, and some of the African countries-have
continued to express reluctance to move these topics to the forefront
of negotiations. Developed countries have pressed for special
negotiating sessions on the issues, but these countries have resisted,
arguing that the Doha agenda does not provide for special sessions.'20
On the other hand, there are indications that at least some
developing countries may have the capacity and interest to
participate in serious negotiations to add at least some of these issues
to the WTO's mandate. Eighteen Latin American nations are already
2002).
118. Daniel Pruzin, Moore Warns of Difficul Fifth Meeting of WTO in 2003 to
Resolve Singapore Issues, 47 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1895 (Nov. 29, 2001).
119. See How to Approach 'Singapore" Issues, I I WASH. TRADE DAILY, Feb.
26-27, 2002, at 1 (reporting developing countries have pointed out that Doha's
Development Agenda contains "no mandate for either special or dedicated
sessions").
120. See id. (noting that developed countries have pressed for special
negotiating sessions on "Singapore" issues like Trade and Investment, Competition
Policy, Trade Facilitation and Transparency in Government Procurement, but
developing countries have insisted that there was no mandate in Doha for such
sessions).
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participating in negotiations under the Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas, which touch on obligations of transparency in government
procurement. 2' Developing countries also have interests and needs
related to the other Singapore issues, which could usefully be
addressed:
It should be borne in mind that the need for multilateral rules on
competition and investment were originally raised by developing
countries themselves, at the end of the 1970s, within the UNCTAD
framework and maintained until today in our mandate. Work in these
areas ... could concentrate on identifying the elements of viable
solutions, which would be most compatible with the interests of
developing countries.
[T]here is an urgent need to identify the anti-competitive practices that
inhibit the export of goods and services of the developing countries,
particularly, the LDCs, and impair the productive capacity of their own
firms in their own markets. It is clear that in countries that have adopted
or are in the process of adopting market-oriented reforms, competition
policy plays an essential role.
122
Participation in serious negotiations on these issues may also
allow developing countries to link progress with progress on their
priorities concerning reform of existing WTO rules.123 However, the
121. See Mike Moore, The Challenges of the Doha Development Agenda for
Latin American and Caribbean Countries, Address Before the Inter-American
Development Bank (Feb. 27, 2002) (noting that Singapore issues are already being
addressed in regional and bilateral negotiations outside the multilateral WTO
forum), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/spmm-e/spmm78_e.htm
(last visited Mar. 22, 2002).
122. Ricupero, Development Implications of Doha, 29 SOUTH BULLETIN, at 18-
19, available at http://www.sountcentre.org/info/southbul letin/
bulletin29/bulletin29-09.htm#P455_77051 (last visited Mar. 19, 2002); see also
Someshwar Singh, Doha Set The Stage For Future Negotiations Ricupero, 24-25
SOUTH BULLETIN at 2, 4 (Nov. 30, 2001) ("[l]f countries fear something in
investment or competition, they should formulate proposals to address those
fears-good legal rules that would prevent those fears from materializing."),
available at http://www.southcentre.org/info/southbulletin/bulletin24-
25/bulletin24-25-0 I.htm#P35_5875.
123. See Rafael D. Frankel, Momentum Toward New WTO Round EmergesJfrom
EU and ASEAN Meetings, 18 Int. Trade Rep. (BNA) 1477 (Sep. 20, 2001)
(reporting that the EU was willing to compromise on its Antidumping position if
developing countries were equally prepared to compromise on issues like
environment and minimum investment and competition standards).
BALANCE IN THE DOHA NEGOTIA TIONS
definitive position of developing countries on the Singapore issues
remains to be seen.
6. AD/SCM Agreements
Members agreed to negotiations on WTO rules on dumping and
subsidies-a priority for developing countries that believe that
developed economies such as the United States have used the
Uruguay Round Agreements on dumping and subsidies as a means of
protectionism. 24 This was an agreement that the United States had
resisted. 2 There is a commitment in these negotiations to take the
needs of developing country and LDC participants into account,
particularly with regard to fisheries subsidies.'-2 6
Including the dumping and subsidy rules in the negotiations may
be a positive development from the standpoint of encouraging
developing countries' equal participation in the WTO. If stronger
multilateral disciplines on anti-dumping and countervailing duty
proceedings can be developed, this would show that developing
countries are able to work through the WTO process to achieve
important market access goals.2 7 An important question, of course,
124. See Pruzin, supra note 108, at 1857 (noting some Members sought
negotiations on the Antidumping and Subsidies Agreements to address perception
that the United States was using these instruments for protectionism); see also id.
at 1856 (explaining that Doha mandate was to clarify and improve the
Antidumping and Subsidies Agreements).
125. See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. lWelcomes 1'O Plan for Launching New Trade
Talks but Sees Problems Ahead, 18 Int. Trade Rep. (BNA) 1548 (Oct. 4, 2001)
(acknowledging Congressional opposition to reopening negotiations on the
Antidumping and Subsidies Agreements).
126. See Doha Declaration, supra note 74, paras. 28-29 (emphasizing fisheries
subsidies particularly, due to their importance in developing countries'
economies).
127. It should be noted that developing countries increasingly have a more
nuanced attitude toward these measures, as they become users, not merely targets,
of such actions. See WTO Annual Report, supra note 71, at 31 (noting India has
initiated 27 AD investigations tying the United States as second highest user of AD
measures). For example, India has used antidumping measures against Chinese
imports, as trade between the two grew even prior to China's WTO accession. See
Pruzin, supra note 108, at 1857. India, and other developing countries, may find
that they are better served by negotiating to refine rules that they themselves plan
to use, rather than by negotiating special and differential treatment separating
themselves from the rules, or pressing for further phase-in delays.
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will be how the needs of developing countries are taken into account.
Will this mandate mean that the talks address substantive
antidumping/countervailing duty reforms of interest to developing
countries? Or, will it mean that developing countries maintain and
expand the existing "special treatment" for their subsidies in Article
27 of the SCM Agreement?1 8
Developing countries have important market-liberalizing interests
in the anti-dumping and countervailing duty area, such as preserving
their hard-won market access on products such as textiles and
avoiding an impossible competition with the subsidies provided by
richer countries. 129 The Doha negotiations will reveal whether
countries see their interests more as liberalizing other markets or as
protecting their own.
7. Technical Cooperation and Capacity Building
Underlying the work program laid out in the Doha Declaration is a
series of commitments to technical cooperation and capacity for
developing and less-developed countries. 30 If such commitments are
fulfilled, developing countries and LDCs will have a greater ability
to participate equally in structuring the new round to respond to their
needs and interests. On the other hand, there is potential for backlash
from the developing countries if the agreed commitments are not
met.' There is a possibility the developing countries could refuse to
negotiate or agree on disciplines in certain areas, or on any integrated
agreement, if the commitments are not fulfilled. This problem may
be especially acute with respect to the "Singapore issues" to be
added after the Fifth Ministerial.
128. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex I A (Apr. 15, 1994),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/final-e.htm.
129. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (referring to the Agreement
on Textiles and Clothing that developing countries have heralded as entitling them
to market access into developed countries' markets).
130. See, e.g., supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text (analyzing the
commitment to address technical assistance and capacity building related to the
Singapore issues).
131. See Moore, supra note 121 (noting the importance of providing technical
assistance and capacity building to developing countries, because of the trust they
displayed in joining the consensus at Doha).
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The WTO as an organization does appear to be rapidly taking
steps to address developing countries' concerns that commitments to
capacity building and technical assistance for developing and LDC
countries may not be met. Based on the Doha Ministerial
Declaration, the sub-committee on Least-Developed Countries has
already agreed on a work program. 3 2 Technical assistance and
capacity building are addressed in several elements of the program.
There is an expressed commitment to work with other international
agencies to achieve these goals, and an expressed commitment to
enable more LDCs to join the WTO. The WTO's budget for 2002
will also include spending on technical capacity and training
assistance for Members that is eighty percent higher than previous
budgets."3 Such significant efforts should make it easier for
developing countries to accept new obligations, and thereby achieve
greater market access and avert measures that threaten to restrict
their access. 134
B. THE NEW ROUND
As discussed above, the tension between the "special treatment"
and "equal participation" paradigms is inherent in all aspects of the
Doha negotiations. This section seeks to set forth a few basic
principles that seem necessary in order for developing countries'
participation to occur in a way that liberalizes rather than restricts
market access.
132. See WTO Work Programme for LDCs Adopted by Subcommittee on
LDCs, (Feb. 13, 2002), WT/COMTD/LDC/I I [hereinafter Work Programme for
LDCs] (stating work programme for LDCs will focus on systemic issues such as
market access, trade related technical assistance and capacity building initiatives,
etc.), available at http:/Avvv.wto.orglenglish/news-e/pres02-e/pr272_e.htm.
133. See Moore Meets Ministers, Senior Officials in Doha Follow-up, Press/269,
Jan. 22, 2002 (reporting that the WTO budget will include an eighty percent
increase in technical capacity and training assistance from earlier budgets),
available at http://wwv.wto.or/englishnewse/pres02-e/pr269_e.htm.
134. For instance, a greater degree of participation in the new obligations might
help developing countries to stave off the use of labor and environmental standards
to hinder their access to European and North American markets.
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1. Enhanced Participation by Developing Countries Is Fundamental
For developing countries to take on new obligations in the Doha
talks, and thereby obtain greater market access themselves, they will
properly insist upon equal participation in making the rules.
Developing countries are already taking an active role in structuring
this round of trade negotiations. Their meaningful participation in the
round is recognized as crucial to the success of future negotiations.
WTO Director General Mike Moore has said:
The Doha Development Agenda agreed last year will fail without
dramatic progress in market access. It will fail if we do not build capacity
so that marginalized and capacity-constrained nations can meaningfully
participate in complex new development negotiations and develop good
governance in such areas as investment, government procurement, trade
facilitation, competition and the environment.1 3
5
Besides the necessary building of developing countries' ability to
negotiate, China's accession to the WTO may also help developing
countries participate meaningfully in the Doha Agenda. China has
allied itself with developing countries in the trade talks. 36 Others
have already recognized that "with China, India and Pakistan
expected to remain firm on new ground rules for the negotiating
committees, many least-developed and developing countries were
emboldened similarly to oppose whatever Quad Members say-a
significant post-Doha development that emerged because of China's
new-found presence."' 37 Of course, the results of these ties with
China will depend on how China chooses to act within the WTO.
135. Michael Moore, Making Globalization Work, Address Before the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Feb. 20, 2002, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/spmm-e/spmm76-e.htm (last visited Mar. 22,
2002).
136. See China to Play 'Constructive' Role at WTO, I 1 WASH. TRADE DAILY,
Jan. 28, 2002, at 2 (noting China's allegiance to developing countries in the WTO).
137. WTO Agreement Near on TNC, 11 WASH. TRADE DAILY, Jan. 31, 2002, at
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2. The Negotiations Should Give Priority to Developing Country
Interests, but Emphasize Market Liberalization Rather Than Market
Restriction
Regardless of whether developing countries are able to participate
equally in negotiations, the emphasis on special and differential
treatment in the Work Program ensures that the need for "special
treatment" will be an on-going topic throughout the different areas of
negotiation.
The challenge will be to implement "special treatment," in light of
the commitment to strengthen such provisions, in such a way that
markets are liberalized and not closed. For example, Pakistan
(supported by seven other developing countries) has already
proposed that a "development box" be added to the Agreement on
Agriculture to allow LDCs to "depart from normal rules" so that they
may offer domestic support and export subsidies to their agricultural
sector.'38 Pakistan argues such an exemption to the rules would allow
LDCs to "catch up" with more developed countries that offered such
programs in the past. India has proposed a new set of special and
differential rules to protect poor farmers and support rural
development.3 9 India has argued in the same negotiations that
developing countries should be allowed to "hike tariffs, [to] have the
ability to impose special safeguard measures and [to] amend current
rules for tariff-rate quota administration so that 'developing
countries' exports can have improved access opportunities in the
markets of WTO Members using TRQs."'I0
It would be preferable to provide "special treatment" by taking up
the aspects of these proposals that liberalize trade, rather than the
elements that would increase tariffs and restrict markets. In the long
run, special treatment via high tariffs seems less likely to allow for
the development of sustainable rural development and food security
138. See Another Ag 'Box' in WTOfor LDCs?, I1 WASH. TRADE DAILY, Feb. 5,
2002, at 3-4 (noting United States opposition to development box concept because
the United States argued that Doha called for phasing out and reducing export
subsidies).
139. See Splitting Over Ag S&DTfor LDCs, I 1 WASII. TRADE DAILY, Feb. 6,
2002, at 1 (reporting that India submitted a paper during WTO agriculture
negotiations, which proposed new special and differential treatment for LDCs).
140. Id.
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than improving access to developed country markets (and markets of
other developing countries) for LDCs and developing countries.' 4'
As one author writes:
[T]rade liberalization must be balanced, and it must reflect the concerns
of the developing world. It must be balanced in agenda, process, and
outcomes. It must take in not only those sectors in which developed
countries have a comparative advantage, like financial services, but also
those in which developing countries have a special interest, like
agriculture and construction services. It must not only include intellectual
property protections of interest to the developed countries, but also
address issues of current or potential concern for developing countries,
such as property rights for knowledge embedded in traditional medicines,
or the pricing of pharmaceuticals in developing-country markets.
142
Developed-country offers to improve market access on products of
particular interest to developing countries would be a preferable form
of special and differential treatment. The Doha negotiations will need
to take account of the need to identify and respond to market access
barriers, which affect goods and services in which developing
countries may have competitive opportunities to export to developed
country markets. This will mean some soul searching for developed
country leaders who must face down the interests of domestic textiles
and agricultural producers as well as some industrial product
producers who would prefer not to have competition from low-wage
economies.143
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that there are ways in which the
WTO could take into account developing country interests without
providing "special treatment." A commitment to reflect the special
needs of developing countries need not be equated with special
141. See id. (stating that the "European Union asked - 'if the Like-Minded-
Group of countries need their existing or even higher level of protection in their
domestic markets, how will they succeed in competing with the Cairns group for a
share of lower priced markets in the developed countries?').
142. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, Two PRINCIPLES FOR THE NEXT ROUND: OR, IOW TO
BRING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN FROM THE COLD 3 (Geneva, 1999).
143. See Tangled Up in Textiles, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 2002, 25 (discussing
significant political pressure by textile interests in the United States); id.
(questioning the United States' commitment to free trade when the United States
refused to increase quotas or cut tariffs for Pakistani textiles in response to strong
domestic lobbying against such action).
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treatment. For example, many developing countries, particularly the
LDCs, would be interested in quicker and simpler dispute settlement.
This would require less commitment of resources and require less
technical capability. Faster resolution of certain disputes might also
make them more willing to use the Dispute Settlement
Understanding.
3. The Way Forward Is Not by Going Backward
Greater market access for developing country interests, which
facilitates development through trade, is preferable to re-balancing
by weakening the existing liberalisation commitments of WTO
Members. Using the famous "bicycle" model of trade liberalization,
if it is hard to stay upright without pedalling forward, it is even
harder when pedalling backward. Aside from the restrictive impact
of such measures themselves, they would set an ominous precedent
for the WTO and would undermine the credibility of developing
countries as negotiating partners.
This does not rule out reconsideration of the Uruguay Round
obligations in light of the reality of implementation since 1995.
Where it will help implementation, further flexibility should be made
available, but only where absolutely necessary in light of analysis of
the implementation problems and other possible solutions such as
technical assistance. Simplifying Uruguay Round commitments and
providing technical assistance should help ease the pressure for roll-
back of Uruguay Round commitments. However, it is important that
developed countries be responsive in negotiations.
Will developing countries conclude that their interests are better
served by a round that achieves meaningful market opening reforms
in sectors of interest to them, than by "rolling back" under the banner
of "implementation" substantive commitments made in the Uruguay
Round? Here, there is a relationship to the implementation issue
discussed earlier. Simplifying the original commitments, where
possible, and providing technical assistance would promote a
positive, market-liberalizing outcome to this critical question.
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CONCLUSION
There are serious questions as to whether the agenda laid out at
Doha is an agenda that can succeed in reaching a single integrated
agreement. Notably, not until 2003, and the Fifth Ministerial, will
there be resolution of the question of negotiations on the Singapore
issues. At the same time a decision will have to be made as to
whether there has been sufficient capacity building such that the
WTO's less developed Members can effectively take part in
negotiations.
The challenge for developing (and developed) countries as
negotiations begin is not to focus solely on the apparent benefits that
may be gained from the rollback or further delay of Uruguay Round
commitments or new concessions of special and differential
treatment. A negotiation that achieves meaningful market opening
reforms in sectors of interest to developing countries-such as
agriculture or textiles-is a negotiation that would better serve the
long-term goal of development.144 The "Development Box" proposal
by developing countries in the ongoing agricultural negotiations has
already brought charges that developing countries seek to "pick and
choose."' 1
45
144. But see DANi RODRIK, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF TRADE As iF
DEVELOPMENT REALLY MATTERED 11 (UNDP Oct. 2001), available at
http://www.undp.org/mainundp/propoor/docs/povglobalgovemancetrade-pub.pdf
(last visited Mar. 23, 2002). Rodrik states:
One of the key propositions is that developing countries are short-changing
themselves when they focus their complaints on specific asymmetries in
market access (tariff peaks against developing country exports, industrial
country protection in agriculture and textiles, etc.) .... [t]hey would be far
better served by pressing for changes that enshrine development at the top of
the WTO agenda, and correspondingly provide them with a better mix of
enhanced market access and maneuvering room to pursue appropriate
development strategies.
This perspective appears to overlook the inherent linkage between "enhanced
market access" and "maneuvering room"-it is unlikely that developing countries
will be able to obtain significant market access while avoiding commitments
regarding their own domestic policies.
145. See Daniel Pruzin, Major Traders Throw Cold Water on Calls fbr
'Development Box' in Agriculture Talks, 19 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 262 (Feb. 14,
2002) (noting that United States officials contend that the "Development Box"
proposal is inconsistent with the Doha mandate which requires all WTO Members
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Developing countries will not be successful in obtaining
significant market access if they seek solely to gain preferential
treatment.' 46 Rather, developing and developed countries must work
together to assemble a workable and attractive package on improved
market access for sectors of particular interest to developing
countries. While the concept of "special treatment" will always be a
component of WTO negotiations, its use to avoid market
liberalization is problematic and should be reserved for cases where
it is truly essential.
to make commitments on all agricultural products).
146. See id. (remarking that many developing countries, such as Cairns Group
Members, Argentina, Chile, and Thailand contend that allowing developing
countries greater flexibility to use farm subsidies would not be in their interest and
that the WTO should instead encourage more trade amongst developing nations).
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